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Speaking volumes
Reviewed by Nancy B. Rapoport

The real reason why businesses make bad decisions
Corporate Governance:
Promises Kept, Promises Broken
By Jonathan R. Macey
Princeton University Press
2008, 344 pages, $35.00
ISBN 978-0-691-12999-0
Jonathan Macey’s new book, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken, provides insight into how
corporations are run, and, in so doing,
takes aim at some traditional theories
of governance. Given the governance
failures in our post-Enron environment, now is a particularly good time
to read this book.
I started paying attention to corporate governance issues when we began
to study the failures of Enron, WorldCom, and the other fiascos of the early
2000s. As I read about the mistakes
that the Enron board made, I wondered why so many very smart people
could make so many really dumb decisions. How difficult is it to say “no”
to a chief financial officer who wants
to engage in self-dealing with his own
company? Apparently, the Enron board
found it impossible to say “no” to Andy
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Fastow, Enron’s own CFO (who made
a personal profit of over $40 million in
his deals with Enron, and who’s now
serving time for his crimes). Enron
waived its own ethics rules to allow
Fastow to sit across from Enron at the
bargaining table and to let Fastow help
Enron hide poorly performing deals
from easy discovery. (Here’s a clue,
board members: if what you’re considering involves waiving an ethics rule at
all, just don’t do it.)
Some good things came out of
Enron’s governance failures, although
not very many good things. Probably
the most important good thing was
that more people started to pay attention to corporate governance—and to
what distinguishes good governance
from bad governance. I’ve noticed
that board membership has started
to become less decorative (although
most boards are still not very diverse
in terms of gender or skill sets). People have started to take their board
responsibilities more seriously. Board
members are paying more attention to
financial statements. All of these developments are good.
But we still have a long way to go.
Boards continue to overcompensate
their officers and award bonuses for
short-term behavior that can ruin companies in the long run. They’re still
allowing their companies to engage in
short-term, high-risk ventures without
necessarily understanding exactly the
level of risk that those ventures involve.
Macey’s book helps to explain why,
despite our best efforts, we really haven’t
learned all that much from Enron.
What I admire most about this book
is that he comes out swinging about
whether even smart boards actually
do any good at all. I wish I’d written
this book, although I could never have

done it with the same flair and wisdom that Macey has done. So I’m glad
he’s said what I’d been thinking: that
no amount of brains or talent can fix
this system by assuming that boards
can really govern.
This book really is too chock-full
of good points to do it justice in a
short book review, so this review will
focus on his discussion about boards
(Chapters 4 and 5). He highlights
the difference between managing and
monitoring:

The intuition that directors add
value is strong and deeply held.
That intuition is not challenged
here. What is challenged is the
deeply held assumption that traditional directors add value by serving shareholders as independent
monitors of managers. It is more
likely that directors nominated and
elected through traditional board
processes serve managers by supporting them. Sometimes, particularly when managers have useful
and constructive strategic advice for
management, directors add value
for shareholders. At other times,
however, such as when managers
need directors to approve managers’ aggressive salary requirements
or when managers need insulation
from the market for corporate control or pesky institutional investors,
so-called independent directors
at best do not reduce shareholder
value, and at worst they destroy it.
(Macey at 51.)
That’s a strong statement, but is
there anyone who has read the financial news over the past year or so who
can really disagree with it?
Part of Macey’s strength in this book
comes from his willingness to debunk
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the traditional notion that corporate
governance comes not from a contract
(real or imagined) between shareholders and the company, but from
the “investors’ legitimate investmentbacked expectations.” Those expectations, which include the expectation
that the company’s managers won’t
steal from the corporation or lie to the
public, just aren’t monitored well by
directors who have been handpicked
by the managers themselves. There’s
nothing nefarious in this assertion.
People tend to prefer to be in collegial
groups, and it’s difficult to be a naysayer who slows down a group’s decision making.
But Macey also shows us what happens when these collegial groups have
to make some hard decisions. Pointing to such common problems as
board capture, Macey explains that
“it is virtually impossible to identify,
much less to monitor and control,
the myriad ways that board independence can be compromised.” In
Chapter 5, he gives us examples of

what I call big, boneheaded board
mistakes. The Disney board’s hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz and
the Enron board’s willingness to opt
out of any use of common sense—
two of the best-known examples of
big, boneheaded mistakes in recent
U.S. corporate law—demonstrate just
how easily smart people can, subconsciously, force each other to make bad
decisions.
There is a lot of solid social science that explains why smart people
end up doing some very dumb things.
What Macey’s book demonstrates so
convincingly is that blindly putting
our trust in any governance structure
(whether it’s boards, or regulations, or
derivative suits), without understanding that humans have certain cognitive
biases, will result in us leaving the lessons of corporate fiascos on the table.
The best laws, the most conscientious
directors, and the most favorable dispute resolution climate still can’t overcome human nature. Any governance
system that doesn’t understand that

humans can be pressured into groupthink, and that humans can talk themselves into walking on the wrong side
of the ethical line, is a governance system that’s doomed to fail.
I was in a cab the other day, riding to a lecture and talking with the
cabdriver about the economy. “You
know,” he said, “the really sad thing
is that, when Enron went down, we
thought that that was the worst thing
in the world. Too bad we didn’t realize that Enron was part of the good
times, compared to what we have
now.” We’re suffering now in large
part because businesses have continued to make bad decisions—decisions
blessed by their boards—without
some sort of “loyal opposition” (perhaps a new officer—the Chief Naysayer?) to slow down the groupthink.
Now that we have a good new book
that gives us more insight into how
boards work (or how they don’t), let’s
take that next step.
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